Willingness to Pay versus Welfare by Sunstein, Cass R.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and
Economics Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
2007
Willingness to Pay versus Welfare
Cass R. Sunstein
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cass R. Sunstein, "Willingness to Pay versus Welfare" ( John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 326, 2007).
 CHICAGO  
JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 326 
(2D SERIES) 
 
 
 
 
Willingness to Pay versus Welfare 
 
Cass R. Sunstein 
 
 
 
THE  LAW  SCHOOL  
THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  
 
 
 
January 2007 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge at the John M. Olin Program in Law and 
Economics Working Paper Series: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html and at the 
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=959724  
Preliminary Draft 12/12/2006  Forthcoming, Harvard Law and Policy Review 
All rights reserved 
 
 
Willingness to Pay versus Welfare 
 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
 
 
Economists often analyze questions of law and policy by reference to the criterion of 
private willingness to pay (WTP), with the belief that people’s WTP for a good is an accurate 
proxy for the welfare that they would obtain from that good. For two reasons, the proxy is crude. 
The first problem is that people may not pay for all of the benefits they receive, and in such cases, 
use of WTP may lead in unfortunate directions, even or especially if welfare is our lodestar. 
Inefficient results may nonetheless increase welfare. The second and more fundamental problem 
is that people may be willing to pay for goods whose acquisition does not improve their welfare. 
People typically choose on the basis of their “affective forecasting,” and their affective forecasts 
can lead them to make bad blunders. Sometimes people overestimate the welfare effects of both 
losses and gains. These points have many implications for law and policy. In particular, juries 
are probably offering greatly inflated dollar awards for hedonic damages, and the outcome of 
cost-benefit analyses, based on WTP, may not capture welfare, suitably defined. The absence of a 
connection between increases in Gross Domestic Product and self-reported happiness is highly 
suggestive here. 
 
Consider the following cases: 
 
1. Jones, who is wealthy, is willing to pay $1000 and no more for a new television 
set. Jones would enjoy a new television set, but he already has a good television 
set, and he would not, in fact, gain a great deal from a new one. But because he is 
so wealthy, he would be better off with the television set than with $1000. 
2. Smith, who is poor, is willing to pay $75 and no more for a new television set. 
Smith would greatly enjoy a new television set; he does not now have one. He 
would be better off with the television set than with $75. Because he is poor, he 
would be worse off with the television set at a price in excess of $75.  
3. Jenkins, who is poor and disabled, is willing to pay $20 and no more for a 
workplace accommodation that will enable her to work. The cost of the 
accommodation to the employer is $150. If the accommodation is made, Jenkins 
will gain far more in terms of welfare than the employer (and its customers) will 
lose. 
                                                 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political Science, 
University of Chicago. Many thanks to Robert Hahn and Eric Posner for valuable comments on a previous 
draft. 
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4. Wilson, who is very wealthy, now lives in New York; she would be willing to pay 
$1,000,000 for a summer home in Aspen, Colorado. It turns out that if Wilson 
bought that summer home, she would not much enjoy it, and in the long-run she 
would not use it. She would miss her friends and her life in New York. In the end, 
she would be better off with $1,000,000 than with the summer home in Aspen. 
5. Andrews, who is poor, is not willing to pay $600 for a health insurance plan. It 
turns out that if Andrews bought that health insurance plan, her life would be 
much better; she would be far healthier and her chronic back problem would be 
greatly improved. For her, the loss of $600 would be much smaller than the gain, 
in terms of welfare, from purchase of the health insurance plan. 
  
Economists and economically oriented law professors typically work with the 
idea of “willingness to pay” (WTP).1 Their goal is to achieve efficiency, or to maximize 
wealth, and WTP is the metric for assessing both efficiency and wealth.2 Often that goal 
is taken for granted, but it is reasonable for critics to ask: Why should anyone care about 
WTP? The natural answer lies in welfare.3 If people are willing to pay very little for a 
good, they would appear unlikely to gain much from receiving it. If people are willing to 
pay a great deal for a good, they would probably gain a lot if they are able to obtain it. 
The cases of Jones and Smith are exemplary of this basic claim. 
There is no plausible argument that WTP is important in itself.4 If policymakers 
should attend to it, it is because of its connection to welfare.5 If that connection is poor, 
the use of WTP is often very vulnerable, even by reference to the criterion that most 
interests those who use it. In this essay, I identify two reasons why WTP is likely to be a 
crude proxy for welfare, and I offer some discussion of the implications of this 
conclusion for law and policy.  
                                                 
1 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs (1990). 
2 See Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 356 (1990). 
3 Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness vs. Welfare 36-37 (2005). It is also possible to value WTP on 
the basis of autonomy. If people are willing to pay little for a good, we respect their autonomy if we honor 
their decisions. 
4 See Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth A Value?, 9 J. Legal Stud. 181 (1980). 
5 For present purposes I put to one side the relationship between respect for WTP and respect for autonomy, 
though some of the discussion bears on that relationship. 
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The first and more straightforward problem is that sometimes the beneficiaries of 
law do not pay all or most of its cost, and in those circumstances, the results of an inquiry 
into WTP will not tell us what we need to know in terms of welfare. This problem, 
captured in Jenkins’ tale, suggests that efficiency and welfare may not march hand-in-
hand. Inefficient programs can be welfare-promoting—a fact that raises serious 
challenges for those considering when to depart from the outcome suggested by cost-
benefit analysis (CBA). I shall suggest that when those who gain from regulation are 
poor, and when those who lose from regulation are wealthy, regulation may well be 
welfare-promoting even when it fails CBA. A more general implication, familiar to 
utilitarians but playing little role in contemporary economic analysis of law, is that 
substantial redistribution to the poor may well be justified on the ground that it increase 
welfare as such. Because an extra dollar is worth more to the poor than to the wealthy, 
redistribution will increase overall welfare (at least if a system of redistribution can be 
designed without creating harmful incentives).  
The second and more fundamental problem is that people are often willing to pay 
a great deal for goods whose acquisition does not improve their welfare. WTP and 
welfare can be mismatched because of failures in “affective forecasting,” excessive 
optimism, myopia, and related phenomena. The cases of Wilson and Andrews show how 
affective forecasting may go wrong. It should be clear that if people’s affective 
forecasting leads to serious blunders, and if planners are in a position to anticipate those 
blunders, it will be necessary to rethink many questions in law and policy, including such 
areas as consumer protection, occupational safety and health, and environmental law. As 
we shall also see, increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) do not produce increases in 
self-reported happiness, and the relationship between economic growth and welfare 
remains obscure. At a minimum, I shall suggest that policymakers should focus directly 
on the ingredients of welfare—a focus suggesting, for example and at a minimum, that a 
great deal of attention should be paid to methods for reducing mental illness. 
Before we proceed, I should emphasize the limited nature of my argument. I am 
not dealing with the fact that people may be willing to pay something to satisfy malicious 
or sadistic preferences. Many people believe that such preferences should not count even 
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if people are willing to pay a great deal to satisfy them.6 I share that belief but I will not 
attempt to defend it here. Nor am I dealing with non-welfarist objections to the use of 
WTP—as in, for example, the claim that people have certain rights, whatever their WTP.7 
My sole concern is the relationship between WTP and welfare. Finally, I will spend little 
time on the problem of “adaptive preferences”—a problem that arises when people’s 
preferences are adaptive to existing opportunities, including deprivation.8 Suppose that 
people are not willing to pay much to obtain a good, simply because they consider that 
good to be unavailable. (Andrews’ tale is a possible example.) If so, it is possible that law 
and policy should nonetheless make that good available, in the hope that its availability 
will ultimately improve people’s welfare. I do not engage that point directly here, though 
it is connected with the general problem of affective forecasting. 
The argument comes in four parts. Part I sketches the welfarist argument on 
behalf of WTP, attempting to specify the domain in which that argument is most secure. 
Part II shows that when the beneficiaries of law do not pay for it, law may increase 
welfare even though it is inefficient. For law and regulation, an important implication is 
that welfare effects cannot be fully evaluated without an understanding of who is bearing 
the costs and who is receiving the benefits. This understanding is crucial to appreciating 
the welfare effects of regulation, not merely the distributive effects. Part III emphasizes 
ambiguities in the idea of “welfare,” exploring objective accounts and stressing that it is 
important to attend to people’s experiences, not merely their choices; Part III also 
investigates efforts to measure subjective happiness and reported life-satisfaction. A 
highly suggestive puzzle is that there appears to be little or no correlation between 
economic growth and reported life-satisfaction. Part IV explores failures in affecting 
forecasting, and the general problem of “miswanting.” Because of those failures, people 
are sometimes willing to pay a great deal for goods that do not promote their welfare, and 
are sometimes unwilling to pay much for goods that would promote their welfare. It 
follows that if welfare is our lodestar, an emphasis on WTP may lead in the wrong 
                                                 
6 See the discussion in Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness vs. Welfare 418-31 (2005). 
7 See Dworkin, supra note. 
8 See Jon Elster, Sour Grapes (1983); Amartya Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (1985); Martha 
Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (1998). 
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directions. A serious problem is that planners may not be in a good position to know 
when this is so; but we are beginning to obtain some helpful clues. 
 
I. The Welfarist Argument for WTP 
 
Let us begin simply by stipulating that people’s subjective experience is our 
central concern. If so, the use of WTP has many advantages. It is not easy to measure 
welfare. By contrast, policymakers can often work with WTP. WTP might be seen as an 
administrable way of ascertaining the welfare consequences of one or another approach.9 
Moreover, there are defining or “core” cases in which use of WTP makes a great 
deal of sense. Let us suppose that certain issues are arising in a large city, called 
Paretoville. In Paretoville, everyone has the same income and wealth. Suppose that some 
citizens of Paretoville are deciding whether to enter into a contract to buy a certain good. 
The good might be a computer, a diminution of a mortality risk (say, by 1/10,000), an 
insurance policy, or an investment opportunity. Suppose that the relevant citizens are 
willing to pay $X, but no more, to buy the good. If government asks those citizens to pay 
more than $X, it would seem to be doing them no favors. Why should the officials of 
Paretoville require people to pay more than they see fit? If we are interested in welfare, 
citizens’ refusal to pay more than $X should be respected, certainly if they have enough 
information to make an informed decision. At least at first glance, the adequately 
informed citizens of Paretoville should be taken to be in the best position to know 
whether their welfare will be improved if they make the purchase.10 
One of the virtues of the use of the WTP, in the core cases, is that it works for 
poor people no less than for rich people. If the citizens of Paretoville are poor, and if their 
$X is very low, we do not help them if we give them an insurance policy, or a computer, 
or a reduction of risk, that exceeds their WTP. Even if they would benefit a great deal 
from such a good, they would lose more, by their own lights, from being forced to buy it 
at an amount that exceeds their WTP. Let us suppose, then, that the core cases for use of 
WTP are those in which the relevant people, armed with adequate information, seek to 
                                                 
9 This argument is defended in Matthew Adler and Eric Posner, New Foundations for Cost-Benefit 
Analysis (2006). 
10 I defer the question of affecting forecasting. 
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purchase a good at some price X, and the question is whether a planner should ask them 
to buy that good at a price in excess of X.   
To accept the use of WTP in the core cases, it is entirely possible to agree that a 
measure of redistribution would be appropriate. Let us alter the problem slightly and 
assume that Paretoville has a significant amount of inequality. Perhaps private sources, or 
government, should provide poor people with the good at a partial subsidy or even for 
free (that is, without cost to those who are benefited). But as a practical matter, legal 
interventions need not, and often do not, amount to a subsidy to those who benefit from 
it. When regulation is imposed, people may have to pay for what they get. After the 
enactment of workers’ compensation regulation, nonunionized workers faced a dollar-
for-dollar wage reduction—corresponding almost perfectly to the expected value of the 
benefits they received.11 For drinking water regulation, something similar is involved. 
When the government eliminates carcinogenic substances from the water supply, it is not 
as if water companies bear the cost. The cost of regulations is passed onto consumers in 
the form of higher water bills.12 Smith’s tale is a mundane example. 
For purposes of evaluating the welfarist argument for WTP in the core cases, it does not 
matter if the existing distribution of income is unjust or if poor people are, in an 
intelligible sense, coerced to make certain choices by virtue of their poverty. The remedy 
for unjust distributions, and for that form of coercion, is to give people more resources, 
not to require people to buy goods on terms that they find unacceptable. Suppose that 
people are willing to pay only $60 to buy a health care plan because they are not rich—
and that if they had double their current wealth, they would be willing to pay $120. Even 
if this is so, government does them no favors by forcing them to pay the amount that they 
would pay if they had more money.  
 
II. Who’s Paying? Why Inefficient Results May Increase Welfare 
 
A. The Basic Problem 
 
Sometimes the simple model, or the core cases, do not describe reality. Most 
important, people do not always pay all of the cost of what they receive. Sometimes those 
                                                 
11 Price Fishback and Shawn Everett Kantor, A Prelude to the Welfare State (1998). 
12 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 Geo. L.J. 2255 (1992). 
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involved in making law have a great deal of control over whether and how much people 
must pay for those benefits. Perhaps lawmakers can take steps to ensure that the potential 
beneficiaries pay little or nothing—or that much of the underlying payment comes from 
those who have the relevant good or impose the relevant burdens and risks. When this is 
so, the welfare analysis is much more complicated. An emphasis on WTP may therefore 
point in the wrong directions. 
The disability context is an obvious example. Disabled workers do not pay for the 
“reasonable accommodations” required by the statute; but the WTP of those workers may 
be low in comparison to the monetized costs. Nonetheless, the accommodations may 
greatly improve welfare on net.13 Suppose, for example, that a wheelchair-bound person 
is willing to pay only $100 for an accommodation, such as lowering a sink, and that the 
accommodation would cost an employer $200. It is entirely possible that the aggregate 
welfare effects will be positive even though the accommodation is inefficient. In terms of 
welfare, the worker might well gain more than the employer loses. It follows that if 
courts and regulators use WTP to assess costs and benefits under the reasonable 
accommodation requirement of the ADA, they will fail to call for accommodations that 
would greatly improve overall welfare. 
Or consider the context of air pollution regulation. In California, poor people and 
members of minority communities have been net gainers; they do not have to pay for all 
of what they obtain.14 Much of the cost of air pollution reduction has been imposed on 
those who buy new cars. In fact new car purchasers have been “paying heavily,” between 
$1,000 and $2,000 for pollution-reducing equipment.15 The conclusion is that the costs of 
air pollution regulation are borne mostly by people who are wealthy or at best of 
moderate means, who pay “emissions penalties that many of the poor are avoiding.”16 By 
contrast, the greatest improvements in air quality have been experienced in the poorest 
neighborhoods. In 1980, those who lived in wealthier areas faced 25 percent less in the 
way of nitrogen oxide than those in poorer areas, but by 1998, exposure levels were 
                                                 
13 See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis Without Analyzing Costs or Benefits, U Chi L Rev 
(forthcoming 2007). 
14 See Matthew E. Kahn, The Beneficiaries of Clean Air Act Regulation, 24 Regulation 34 (2001). 
15 Id. at 36. 
16 Id.  
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essentially equalized.17 The equality was not produced by increased pollution in wealthier 
areas. On the contrary, significant reductions could be found everywhere. But the larger 
reductions were found in the poorest neighborhoods, formerly suffering from especially 
high pollution levels.18  
The disability and air pollution examples suggest the possibility that poor people 
are gaining more, in terms of welfare, than wealthy people are losing, even if a standard 
economic inquiry into WTP suggests that the relevant regulations are inefficient and 
therefore unjustified. It follows that if we attend to people’s WTP, we might end up with 
an inadequate account of the welfare effects of air pollution regulation. People might well 
be gaining more than they lose, even if the monetized costs appear higher than the 
monetized benefits. Of course the account thus far does not establish that point for air 
pollution regulation in California. But it is certainly plausible to think that whatever the 
WTP of those who benefited from air pollution reduction, the welfare gains (longer lives 
and better health) justified the welfare costs. 
To make these claims less abstract: Suppose that the beneficiaries of a proposed 
drinking water regulation are willing to pay only $80 to eliminate a risk of 1/50,000 in 
drinking water; that the per-person cost of eliminating a 1/50,000 risk is $100; but that for 
every dollar of that cost, the beneficiaries pay only 70 cents. Suppose that the remaining 
30 cents will be paid by water companies themselves, in the form of reduced profits, or 
by employees of the water companies, in the form of reduced wages. In this example, the 
costs of the regulation exceed the benefits; it is inefficient. But in principle, the regulation 
might well be justified on welfarist grounds. After all, the beneficiaries of the regulation 
are being helped a great deal, and their WTP does not tell regulators what they need to 
know in terms of the welfare effects. When people’s ability to pay is low, their WTP will 
be low as well, and their low WTP does not demonstrate that they would gain little in 
terms of welfare from receiving the relevant good.  
The central problem is that WTP is measuring gains and loses in monetary terms, 
rather than in welfare terms. The WTP figures does not answer the question whether 
                                                 
17 Id. at 37-38. 
18 Id. at 38. 
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some people are gaining more, in welfare terms, than others are losing in those terms.19 In 
the example just given, overall welfare might be increased, not diminished. Or imagine 
that a reduction in greenhouse gases greatly diminishes risks faced by people in 
developing nations, above all in India and Africa, which are especially vulnerable to 
climate change.20 Imagine too that such people are unable and hence unwilling to pay a 
great deal for the protection that they obtain. Imagine finally that the cost of the 
regulation is borne by people in wealthy nations, above all the Unites States and 
Europe—and that this cost is higher than the monetized benefits to people in developing 
countries. Even under these assumptions, the regulation might well produce large overall 
welfare gains. If people in developing countries are able to have much longer and 
healthier lives, they might well be gaining far more than people lose in United States and 
Europe—even if their energy bills are higher, their automobile use is more expensive, 
and their wages and employment are reduced.21  
The simple conclusion is that the argument for using WTP is most plausible in 
cases in which the beneficiaries of some act of government pay all or most of its cost. In 
such cases, WTP is reasonably used so long as people are adequately informed and not 
suffering from some kind of cognitive problem.22 The analysis must be different when the 
beneficiaries of regulation are paying only a small fraction of its costs. Unfortunately, 
that different analysis is not simple to conduct. Regulators lack “welfarometers” that can 
tell them about the welfare effects of various courses of action.23 But as we shall see, it is 
possible to devise some simple rules of thumb that should help to show when WTP is 
likely to lead in the wrong direction.  
 
                                                 
19 The discussion assumes that interpersonal comparisons of welfare are feasible. See Adler and Posner, 
supra note, for relevant discussion.  
20 See William Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer, Warming the World 91 (2000). 
21 Of course there might also be a distributional problem. Suppose that in terms of overall welfare, the 
regulation in question is not desirable; it makes aggregate welfare lower rather than higher. But suppose too 
that those who benefit are poorer and more disadvantaged than those who lose. If, for example, those who 
are willing to pay $80 are disproportionately poor, and those who pay the remainder are disproportionately 
wealthy, the regulation might be justified despite the welfare loss. We might well care most about those at 
the bottom, and seek improve their prospects even if those at the top lose more than those at the bottom 
gain. 
22 Again I am bracketing the problem of affecting forecasting. 
23 For discussion of efforts to produce the functional equivalent of welfarometers, see Daniel Kahneman 
and Alan B. Krueger, Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being, 20 J Econ Persp 3 
(2006). 
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B. Cross-National Valuations 
 
This point can be supported, clarified, and applied through an exploration of 
cross-cultural variations in WTP. It should be clear that simply because they have little 
money, people in poor nations will show a lower WTP for various goods than do people 
in wealthy nations. The disparity is not necessarily a product of differences in expected 
welfare from obtaining those goods. Those who show a WTP of $10, to obtain a new 
television, might receive more welfare from the television than those who show a WTP 
of $750. The difference in WTP is not accompanied by a difference in welfare. If poor 
people show a WTP of only $20 to obtain medicine that will prevent a premature death, it 
does not follow that they receive less welfare from their lives than wealthy people who 
show a WTP of $100,000 to obtain the same medicine. 
Consider in this regard the value of a statistical life (VSL), which is compiled by 
attempting to ascertain how much people would be willing to pay to avoid some 
statistical risk—say, a risk of 1/10,000 or 1/100,000. Not surprisingly, studies find that 
across nations, WTP and hence VSL is highly variable, with a VSL as low as $200,000 
for Taiwan, $500,000 for South Korea, and $1.2 million for India—but $19 million for 
Australia.24 Consider, for purposes of illustration, the following table:25 
TABLE 1: VSL ACROSS NATIONS  
Nation and Year of Study VSL (in 2000 US$) 
Taiwan (1997) 2–.9 million 
South Korea (1993) .8 million 
India (1996/97) 1.2–1.5 million 
Hong Kong (1998) 1.7 million 
Canada (1989) 3.9–4.7 million 
Switzerland (2001) 6.3–8.6 million 
Japan (1991) 9.7 million 
Australia (1997) 11.3–19.1 million 
United Kingdom (2000) 19.9 million 
 
Because poor people have less money than rich people, the figures in this table 
should not be terribly surprising. Suppose that we can anticipate that in a particular 
period, there will be 100,000 worldwide deaths from climate change—deaths that include 
                                                 
 24. W. Kip Viscusi and Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market 
Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J Risk and Uncertainty 5, 27-28 (2003), 
 25. See id. 
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(let us make up some numbers) 95,000 people from poor countries and 5000 from 
wealthy ones. Should we say that the former deaths are worth much less attention than 
the latter? Building on evidence of cross-national disparities, some assessments of the 
effects of climate change do find far higher monetized costs from deaths of people in rich 
countries than from deaths of people in poor countries.26 
From the standpoint of welfare, that conclusion makes no sense at all. The fact 
that a poor person in a poor nation would be willing to pay $1 to eliminate a risk of 
1/10,000, whereas a wealthy person in a wealthy nation would be willing to pay $100, 
cannot plausibly be used to defend the view that in terms of welfare, the latter loss is 
worse. To illustrate this point, imagine choosing between two programs: 
(A) Program A would eliminate (at a cost of $600) a 1/10,000 risk faced by fifty poor 
people in India, each willing to pay $20 to eliminate that risk. 
(B) Program B would eliminate (also at a cost of $600) a 1/10,000 risk faced by fifty 
wealthy people in France, each willing to pay $350 to eliminate that same risk. 
There is no reason to think that Program A would have a lower effect on welfare, 
even though the French WTP is far higher than that of the Indians.  
But now consider a different issue. The government in India is deciding on 
appropriate policy to reduce workplace risks; what VSL should it use? Such a 
government would not do well to show the WTP of the citizens of France.27 If citizens in 
a poor nation reveal a WTP of $20 to eliminate risks of 1/10,000, then their government 
does them no favors by requiring them to pay $100 or $50 for that protection. This is the 
                                                 
26.Cf. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Third Assessment Report: Climate Change 2001: 
Mitigation 483 (finding that “[t]he VSL is generally lower in poor countries than in rich countries”), 
available at http://grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg3. See also the discussion of the International Panel on 
Climate Change, Climate Change 2001, available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg3/302.htm: 
“The VSL is generally lower in poor countries than in rich countries, but it is considered unacceptable by 
many analysts to impose different values for a policy that has to be international in scope and decided by 
the international community. In these circumstances, analysts use average VSL and apply it to all countries. 
Of course, such a value is not what individuals would pay for the reduction in risk, but it is an ‘equity 
adjusted’ value, in which greater weight is given to the WTP of lower income groups. On the basis of EU 
and US VSLs and a weighting system that has some broad appeal in terms of government policies towards 
income distribution, Eyre et al. (1998) estimate the average world VSL at around 1 million Euros 
(approximately US$1 million at 1999 exchange rates).” 
27 For discussion with actual data about VSL in India, see Soma Bhattacharya et al., The Value of Mortality 
Risk Reduction in Delhi, India, available at  
http://www.aei.brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=1343 (finding a VSL of $150,000 in the 
context of highway safety). 
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sense in which VSL properly varies across nations, and in which citizens of poor nations 
have lower VSLs than citizens of wealthy ones. If the government of India uses the 
American VSL of $6 million, on the theory that its citizens should not be valued less than 
those of wealthy nations, significant harm to the citizens of India will almost inevitably 
result.  
In the core or defining cases, nothing said thus far argues against use of WTP.28 
Outside of those cases, the issue is more complicated. In India, as elsewhere, it is possible 
that the beneficiaries will pay for only a fraction of what they get, and that the losers will 
lose less, in welfare terms, than the gainers will gain in those terms. Nonetheless, it is 
entirely sensible for the government of India to spend far less on risk reduction than the 
governments of France and the United States. The government does not spend far less on 
the ground that Indian lives are “worth less” than French or American lives; instead it 
does so on the ground that it is concerned with the welfare of its citizens, and a French or 
American VSL will reduce the welfare of the citizens of India. But it remains true that if 
welfare is our guide, serious risks, faced by countless people in poor nations, deserve 
special priority, and the WTP of those people is a poor proxy for welfare.  
 
C. Law and Policy 
 
 1. Taxes vs. regulation. At the domestic level, there is a standard answer to 
arguments of this sort. Suppose that poor people are willing to pay relatively little for air 
pollution controls and that wealthy people strongly resist the cost of such controls. 
Suppose too that even though such controls are therefore unjustified on efficiency 
grounds, they might be justified on grounds of welfare. If so, the best approach would be 
not to impose the controls, but to redistribute resources to poor people. Redistribution is 
the more effective and more efficient method for achieving welfare goals.  
 Before examining this claim, note that there is a larger point in the background 
here. If a marginal dollar is worth more to poor people than to wealthy people, then there 
is a strong argument for significant redistribution on welfare grounds, all things being 
equal.29 If the goal is to increase welfare, a large amount of redistribution would seem to 
                                                 
28 The discussion of problems of affective forecasting, below, does offer some such arguments. 
29 See Kaplow and Shavell, supra note, at 30. 
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be mandatory, even if equality as such has no importance. An evident problem is that 
redistribution might remove desirable incentives and for that reason decrease welfare.30 
But this problem should not be taken as decisive; it raises an empirical challenge, which 
is to design the optimal redistributive strategy, taking incentives into account. 
 The broader point is correct: The best response to the problem I have identified is 
redistributive taxation.31 Unfortunately, the political system often blocks such taxation, 
and it does so even if it authorizes law and policy that promotes welfare less efficiently. 
We need not pause to consider why this might be so. The simple point is that realistically 
speaking, the choice is often between some status quo and a policy that is both inefficient 
and welfare-increasing. The choice should be made in favor of welfare, not efficiency. 
The choice is even easier in the international context. It may well be impossible to 
redistribute resources from wealthy nations to poor ones; no mechanism is available to 
produce such redistribution. At the same time, it might well be possible to obtain an 
international accord that is both inefficient and welfare-increasing. 
 2. Administering welfare; a challenge for the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (and Others). Difficult administrative issues do remain. Suppose that a 
proposed law is expected to eliminate 100 premature deaths, stemming from risks of 
1/100,000, at a cost of $800 million; suppose too that the median population-wide WTP, 
for risks of 1/100,000, is $60, indicating a VSL of $6 million. At first glance, the law is 
inefficient. The analysis is straightforward if the case arises in Paretoville and if the 
problem falls within the core or defining cases. But if it does not, planners must 
investigate the incidence of the relevant benefits and burdens. If the $800 million cost is 
borne mostly by wealthy people, the policy might well be welfare-increasing even though 
it is inefficient. It is now standard, in the regulatory domain, to investigate whether the 
                                                 
30 Insofar as the incentives would produce economic growth, there is a complication, which is that 
economic growth might not produce welfare gains. See Robert Frank, Luxury Fever (2000). 
31 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in 
Redistributing Income, 23 J. Legal Stud. 667, 667 (1994) (“[R]edistribution through legal rules offers no 
advantage over redistribution through the income tax and typically is less efficient.”); Steven Shavell, A 
Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 
414, 414 (1981) (describing how income tax can compensate for inefficient liability rules and redistribute 
income); David A. Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute Income?, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
439, 439–40 (2003) (“[T]he tax system is a better tool for redistribution of income than legal rules.”). 
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beneficiaries of regulation are disproportionately poor.32 But even if we learn that they 
are, we do not know enough to know whether regulation is desirable. Perhaps the 
beneficiaries are poor, but perhaps they will bear most of the cost as well; perhaps this is 
Paretoville after all. And even if the beneficiaries are not poor, the regulation might be 
welfare-increasing if those who pay are mostly rich. An investigation of the incidence of 
both benefits and costs will provide relevant information on whether regulation will 
promote welfare even if it is inefficient. 
 The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, entrusted with managing 
executive orders calling for cost-benefit analysis of regulatory proposals, would do well 
to pay attention to this problem. As a first approximation, it is not implausible to 
emphasize cost-benefit analysis on the ground that it is a rough proxy for welfare.33 But 
where the proxy fails, the analysis must be qualified. Where does the proxy fail? For 
purposes of policy, there is a simple answer. If the beneficiaries are poor, and if the costs 
are borne by those who are wealthy, the outcome of a cost-benefit analysis based on WTP 
should not be determinative. If the beneficiaries stand to gain a great deal in welfare 
terms, and those who pay are unlikely to lose much in those terms, the policy should go 
forward. Unfortunately, there is no simple metric by which to quantify the welfare 
judgments. But in some cases, at least, the conclusion will be easy enough to reach. 
 
III. What Is Welfare? 
 
The argument thus far has said nothing about what is meant by the idea of 
“welfare.” The basic idea might be specified in many different ways.34 Most economists 
understand welfare by reference to people’s subjective preferences—as, for example, in 
that idea that X will promote A’s welfare more than Y if and to the extent that A prefers 
X over Y.35 For those who rely on subjective preferences, it is important to try to ensure 
that A has adequate information; if the watch for which A is willing to pay $75 is likely 
                                                 
32 See Executive Order 12866, section (b)(5) 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (1993) (referring to “distributive impacts” 
and to “equity”). See also the discussion of distributional considerations in Office Mgmt. & Budget 
Circular A-4 42-46 (2003). 
33 Matthew Adler and Eric A. Posner, New Foundations for Cost-Benefit Analysis (2006).  
34 A good discussion can be found in id. 
35 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness vs. Welfare (2004). 
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to work for only one month, A should be appraised of that fact. The simple point is that 
the idea of welfare might be measured by asking what A in fact prefers.  
Note in this regard that A’s preference might have little to do with narrowly self-
interested desires on A’s part. A might prefer to give $75 to charity, rather than to keep it; 
A might prefer to do considerable work on behalf of a favored cause, even though the 
work is not at all enjoyable. A’s preferences may not promote A’s welfare, narrowly 
conceived, if A prefers to take actions that do not promote his welfare, narrowly 
conceived.36 The standard economic emphasis on people’s subjective preferences has the 
considerable advantage of attending to what people care about, whether or not their 
concerns are always or even mostly connected with their own happiness or self-interest, 
narrowly conceived.  
 
A. Objective Welfare? 
 
Economists typically speak in terms of people’s subjective experience.37 But it is 
possible to understand the notion of welfare in more objective terms. On this view, the 
right question is whether people’s lives are good, not whether they think that their lives 
are good (even though their thoughts are highly relevant to the right question). Suppose 
that A’s life consists mostly of accumulating campaign buttons, or Chicago White Sox 
memorabilia, or money. Suppose that A spends most of his waking hours trying to 
acquire as much as he possibly can. It is plausible to think that A’s life, objectively 
understood, is not a good one, and that A’s welfare, properly understood, would be higher 
if his life were not so dedicated.  
In an extreme case, A might suffer from some kind of mental disability, which 
leads him to be obsessed and therefore miserable; he chooses patterns that make his life 
miserable. A badly needs help. It is not enough, indeed it is hopeless and cruel, simply to 
allow A to satisfy his preferences. More optimistically, he might actually enjoy his efforts 
at accumulation, but his life is narrow, repetitive, compulsive, and without much 
meaning, even by his own lights.  
                                                 
36 I put to one side the question whether it is true or useful to say that A’s welfare is promoted when A 
engaged in actions that help others. 
37 See, e.g., Kaplow and Shavell, supra note, at 18-24. 
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In any case, we might believe that whether A’s life is good depends (partly) on 
what it includes, not (entirely) on what A thinks, independently of the circumstances 
under which A has developed those thoughts. Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have 
elaborated a “capabilities approach” to human development, one that might be seen as 
welfarist insofar as it attempts to specify some capabilities that are taken to be 
indispensable preconditions for a good life.38 The capabilities approach begins with an 
objective account of what people should be able to do and to be; if people lack the 
relevant capabilities, they might be taken to lack the preconditions for welfare, or well-
being.39 Both Sen and Nussbaum also refer to “functionings,” understood to refer to what 
people actually do, given the basic capabilities; an idea of functionings might also be 
used as the basis for a welfarist account.40 John Finnis has worked in a broadly similar 
vein.41  
If welfare is understood to have an objective component, it might not be a surprise 
to find that people’s choices, and their WTP, do not promote their welfare at all. If people 
suffer from capability failure, their deprivation may not enable them to make welfare-
promoting choices. Raised under conditions of inequality, women may not want 
significant changes in their situations, only because the underlying conditions have made 
those changes unimaginable. Raised under circumstances of poor health, people may not 
be willing to pay much to improve their health, lacking the resources or the information 
that would enable them to know what better health could actually mean or entail. Raised 
without clean air or clean water, or beautiful areas, people might not be willing to pay 
much to improve air or water quality, or to preserve or to increase the number of 
beautiful areas.  
Perhaps the problem here is a lack of information; perhaps preferences have 
themselves adapted to a lack of anything better.42 In either case, we do not promote 
welfare, or for that matter freedom, if we simply honor people’s WTP. And while these 
                                                 
38 See Amartya Sen, DevelopmentAs Freedom (2000); Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human 
Development (2003). 
39 See Nussbaum, supra note, at 78-80. 
40 Id.  
41 See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980). 
42 See Elster, supra note. 
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problems are especially acute in poor nations, it would be most surprising if they could 
not be found in wealthy nations as well. 
 
B. Measuring Subjective Welfare? 
 
An objective account of welfare raises many questions, and it might be best to 
attempt to make progress by investigating the relationship between WTP and welfare in 
more subjective terms. Economists tend to think that if people are willing to pay $75 for a 
watch, they prefer the watch to $75. But it should be clear at the outset that the idea of 
“preference” has a serious ambiguity. Do we mean to measure A’s preference at the time 
of choice, or instead at the time of experience? Suppose that A does choose the watch 
over $75, but that after two days, A concludes that the watch is ugly, that he made a 
stupid decision, and that he would turn back time and undo the transaction if he could. 
Suppose that A actually hates his watch and is made miserable by it. If so, A’s choice has 
not promoted A’s welfare by A’s own lights. If we emphasize A’s subjective well-being, 
we might think that his choices are no more than a proxy for his welfare, rightly 
specified. The question is whether welfare might be measured directly. 
1. Happiness in general. Inspired by this question, many social scientists are 
attempting to measure welfare by exploring how happy people are, either in general or in 
response to particular choices and events.43 The apparent and admittedly inadequate 
premise is that happiness and welfare are identical.44 For the moment, let us take that 
premise as a definition rather than argument; certainly happiness is at least an ingredient 
in welfare. If the goal is to measure happiness, we might do so by asking them, or instead 
by attempting to measure hedonic states in various ways.45  
(a) The puzzling disconnect between economic growth and happiness measures. 
An evident puzzle is that increases in economic growth are not correlated with increases 
in reported life-satisfaction. Consider Figure 1. 
                                                 
43 See, e.g, Richard Layard, Happiness (2005); Daniel Kahneman and Alan Krueger, Developments in the 
Measurement of Subjective Well-Being, 20 J Econ Persp 3 (2006). 
44 Layard, supra note, offers an argument to this effect, which is in my view unconvincing. One might think 
that one’s welfare is promoted by activities that do not produce happiness in its simple form, e.g., good 
works. One might also believe that welfare is promoted by activities that produce a sense of meaning, or 
that fit with people’s preferred ideals, even if they do not in any simple sense make people “happy.” 
45 A good overview is Daniel Kahneman et al., Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology 
(2002). 
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Figure 1: Life Satisfaction and Income per Capita in Japan46 
 
The pattern shown here turns out to be typical. The United States, France, and 
Japan all experienced dramatic increases in real income in the 20th century, but showed 
no increase in subjective well-being.47 An especially striking finding involves China.48 
Between 1994 and 2005, China experienced explosive growth in average real income—
250 percent in fact. In that same period, life satisfaction has actually declined, with a 
reduction in reported “satisfaction” from 80 percent to 70 percent, and an increase in 
                                                 
46 Bruno Frey and A, Stutzer, What can Economists Learn from Happiness Research? 40 Journal of 
Economic Liturature 402 (2002). 
47 Edward Diener, and E. Suh, National Differences in Subjective Well-Being, in Kahneman et al at 439-
441.  
48 See Daniel Kahneman and Alan Krueger, Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being, 
20 J Econ Persp 3, 16 (2006). 
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reported “dissatisfaction” from 21 percent to 35 percent.49 Hence it is not easy to 
establish any kind of correlation between economic growth and increases in subjective 
welfare.  
For purposes of self-reported happiness, what appears to matter is relative 
economic position, not absolute economic position.50 People’s self-reported happiness is 
greatly affected by their position in the economic hierarchy rather than by their absolute 
wealth. By itself, this finding does not demonstrate that WTP is a poor proxy for welfare. 
But it does raise serious problems about any effort to identify WTP with welfare: Even if 
wealth is maximized, in the sense that society’s aggregated WTP is very high and getting 
higher, people’s life-satisfaction may not be better. From existing evidence, it is odd but 
not implausible to say that if GDP of America or France doubled in some period of years, 
we would not pick up any increase in people’s life-satisfaction. (Return to the case of 
China.) If welfare is our lodestar, this possibility raises serious concerns for those who 
believe that economic growth is the best way to increase national well-being.  
Of course self-reported happiness is not the only thing that is important, even if 
welfare is our lodestar. It is possible to question self-reported happiness on the ground 
that it may not adequately measure subjective happiness; perhaps self-reports invite 
relative rather than absolute assessments.51 Even if those reports do measure subjective 
happiness, perhaps subjective happiness should not be our guide. Happiness may not 
increase with growth in GDP, but one result of GDP growth may well be increases in 
longevity, health, and opportunity.52 From the standpoint of increasing human welfare, it 
is good to enable people to live eighty healthy years than forty less healthy years, even if 
the level of daily happiness does not increase. If increases in GDP are correlated with 
longer and healthier lives, and with better opportunities and greater education, such 
increases appear to increase welfare even if subjective happiness stays constant.  
But if the goal really is welfare, we might pursue longevity, health, opportunity, 
education, and subjective happiness directly, and focus on economic growth only to the 
                                                 
49 Id. 
50 See Robert Frank, Luxury Fever (2002). 
51 For a response to this concern, see Kahneman and Krueger, supra note, at 7-9. 
52 For discussion, see Amartya Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (1985). Sen argues that the concern 
should be capabilities, not economic growth, but it is nonetheless true that growth is (imperfectly) 
correlated with improvements in capabilities. 
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extent that it is responsible or a good proxy for the relevant improvements. If the data on 
subjective happiness is taken seriously, the consequences for law and policy would 
appear to be significant, because economic growth would be demoted to a secondary 
goal, to be promoted only to the extent that it helps achieve primary goals, which might 
in any case be pursued directly.53 
(b) Measuring experience. There are major problems with relying on reported 
life-satisfaction as a measure of welfare. Perhaps people report high life-satisfaction even 
though their daily lives are not especially good54; perhaps they report low life-satisfaction 
even though from moment-to-moment, their welfare is high. Daniel Kahneman and his 
coauthors have attempted to learn more about welfare by seeing how much people enjoy 
various activities in which they are engaged.55 They find that some voluntary choices 
produce high levels of self-reported happiness, but that other voluntary choices do not. 
Here is a summary of their preliminary findings: 
 
                                                 
53 See Kahneman and Kruger, supra note, at 18-21. 
54 Cf. Amartya Sen, Resources, Values and Development 307, 309 (1984), showing that widows in India 
gave better self-reports about their health than did widowers, even though the widows were in fact in worse 
health. 
55Daniel Kahneman et al., A survey method for characterizing daily life experience: The Day 
Reconstruction Method (DRM), 306 Science 1776 (2004). 
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Findings of this kind present many puzzles. Evidently people do not much like interacting 
with their co-workers and bosses, at least not compared to interacting with their friends 
and relatives; but work-related interactions may be on balance worthwhile, because 
people are paid for those interactions. From this evidence, then, we cannot conclude that 
people’s choices, or their WTP, do not promote their welfare. But the evidence at least 
suggests the possibility that many people are choosing to engage in behavior that they do 
not much enjoy, or that might not do much to improve their welfare.  
If it were possible to measure the relationship between particular choices and 
particular experiences directly, we would have a test of welfare that might actually be 
used to assess the effects of law and policy. Here the mismatch would not merely be 
between WTP and welfare; it would be between choices and welfare. The result of such a 
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mismatch would be more ambitious than anything I have discussed thus far. Perhaps the 
goal should be to find national “happiness accounts” or “welfare accounts,”56 exploring 
subjective well-meaning at the aggregate level. If such explorations are feasible, an 
emphasis might be made not on GDP, but on changes in aggregate happiness or self-
reported welfare over time. Such an emphasis might significantly alter national priorities. 
We might see, for example, that efforts to reduce mental illness would have a significant 
impact on aggregate happiness or self-reported life-satisfaction—a far more significant 
impact that general efforts to promote economic growth.57 
 
IV. Errors in Affective Forecasting 
 
Focusing more narrowly on particular welfare-reducing choices, a growing 
literature investigates the problem of “miswanting,”58 which arises from failures of 
“affective forecasting.” A decision about what to do, or what to acquire, requires people 
to make judgments about the welfare effects of an action or an acquisition. We know now 
enough to know that these judgments may go badly wrong. Let us see exactly why, and 
then turn to implications for law and policy. 
 
A. Projection Bias 
 
People’s current emotional state has a large impact on their affective forecasts, in 
a way that can produce large errors from their own point of view. A simple 
demonstration, involving consumption choices, is that shoppers at grocery stores are 
greatly influenced by how hungry they are at the time that they shop.59 They fail to adjust 
for the fact that in the next week, they are unlikely to be hungry most of the time.60 In the 
same vein, catalogue shoppers who are making their orders via telephone are greatly 
influenced by the current weather, and hence make choices that they do not later want.61 
                                                 
56 See the discussion in Daniel Kahneman and Alan Krueger, Developments in the Measurement of 
Subjective Well-Being, 20 J Econ Persp 3 (2006). 
57 See Richard Layard, Happiness (2004). 
58 Daniel T. Gilbert and T.D. Wilson, Miswanting, in Thinking and Feeling: The Role of Affect in Social 
Cognition 178 (Joseph P. Forgas ed.) (2000); Timothy D. Wilson and Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective 
Forecasting, 35 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 345 (June 2003). 
59 Affecting Forecasting, supra note, at 361. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 224.  
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When people buy warm clothes on especially chilly days, they are especially likely to 
return those clothes later.62 This distortion has been labeled a “projection bias,” as people 
wrongly project their current emotional state onto their future selves.63  
As Kahneman and Thaler suggest, a similar problem can arise when people join 
sports clubs with the mistaken belief that they will visit the club a great deal. Evidently 
many people greatly overestimate their likely use of such clubs.64 The problem with 
projection bias is that it suggests that people will make choices that do not promote their 
own welfare,65 because they end up products that they will not much enjoy when they are 
using or consuming them. 
Projection bias is closely related to what has been called the “hot/cold empathy 
gap.”66 When people are in “hot” emotional states, they tend to err in anticipating their 
future emotional states; when they are in “cold” states, they blunder with respect to what 
they will want when they are “hotter.”67 Here is a simple demonstration. Visitors to a 
museum were asked to take a short trivia quiz and instructed to select one two possible 
forms of compensation: answers to the quiz or a candy bar. When people were asked to 
make the choice before taking the quiz, they generally chose the candy bar. When people 
were asked to choose after taking the quiz, and hence were in a “hot” state in terms of 
their curiosity, they generally chose the answers.68 It is reasonable to think that when 
people are in a “hot” state, they take risks that they would not otherwise take, in a way 
that might lead to overall welfare losses. Consider unsafe driving, excessive drinking, and 
risky sexual activity. 
Of course it is not clear how or whether public officials should react to the 
possibility of projection bias. The major point is that people might be willing to pay for 
goods that will not promote their welfare—and that they might not be willing to pay for 
goods that will promote their welfare. For this reason, use of WTP, at the time of choice, 
may well lead to welfare losses.  
                                                 
62 Id.  
63 See George Loewenstein et al., Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility, 118 Q.J. Ec. 1209 (2003). 
64 Kahneman and Thaler, supra note.  
65 Id. at 224. 
66 See Affective Forecasting, supra note, at 364-65.  
67 See Daniel Kahneman and Richard H. Thaler, Utility Maximization and Expected Utility, 20 J Ec Persp 
221. 223-25 (2006). 
68 Id. 
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B. Unrealistic Optimism 
 
Many people suffer from excessive optimism.69 With respect to most of the risks 
faced in ordinary life, people show a tendency to be unrealistically optimistic.70 The most 
well-documented findings of optimism involve relative (as opposed to absolute) risk. 
About 90 percent of drivers think that they are safer than the average driver and less 
likely to be involved in a serious accident.71 People generally think that they are less 
likely than other people to be divorced, to have heart disease, to be fired from a job, and 
much more.72 At first glance, a belief in relative immunity from risk seems disturbing, 
but by itself this finding does not establish that people underestimate the risks that they 
actually face. Perhaps people have an accurate understanding of their own statistical risks 
even if they say and believe, wrongly, that other people are more vulnerable than they 
are.73  
But there is also evidence of unrealistic optimism for absolute risks. For example, 
professional financial experts consistently overestimate likely earnings, and business 
school students overestimate their likely starting salaries and the number of offers that 
they will receive.74 People also underestimate their likelihood of being involved in a 
serious automobile accident,75 and their own failure to buy insurance for floods and 
earthquakes is at least consistent with the view that people are excessively optimistic.76 It 
is reasonable to extrapolate that when risk-related behavior is involved, people’s WTP 
may be distorted by excessive optimism. To that extent, it may poorly reflect the welfare 
effects of various courses of action.  
                                                 
69 See David Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of Unrealistic Optimism, in 
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment 334 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds. 2002). 
70 See Shelley E. Taylor, Positive Illusions: Creative Self-Deception and the Healthy Mind 6–11 (1989) 
(proposing that a healthy self-conception is biased toward optimism). 
71 See Taylor, Positive Illusions at 10–11. 
72 See Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Health Problems, 10 J Behav Med 
481, 486 (1987) (listing results from survey obtaining comparative risk judgments from 297 individuals 
about a broad range of hazards). 
73 See W. Kip Viscusi, Smoke-Filled Rooms: A Postmortem on the Tobacco Deal 162–66 (Chicago 2002) 
(using survey data to show that smokers do not ignore risks to themselves as much as underestimate them 
in relation to other smokers). 
74 Armour and Taylor, at 334-35 
75 Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 Vand L Rev 1653, 
1660–61 (1998) (discussing generally individuals’ underestimation of their chances of being in automobile 
accidents). 
76 Id at 1658–62 (discussing individuals’ failure to insure as a function of their over-optimism). Note that 
the availability heuristic can counteract this problem by leading people to insure against salient risks. 
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Here as well, the appropriate legal response is not clear. But at the very least, 
informational strategies, designed to reduce or to eliminate the bias, would seem justified 
from the welfarist point of view.77 
 
C. Myopia 
 
Some people are myopic, emphasizing the short-term at the expense of the 
future.78 Myopic behavior might be seen as a taste for current well-being over future 
well-being, in a way that raises no concerns about welfare losses or bounded rationality; 
but if a day’s welfare gains are purchased at the expense of long-term distress, bounded 
rationality is probably involved. Myopia helps to account for self-control problems, by 
which consumers make decisions that undermine their well-being over time. Consider 
here the problems associated with insufficient exercise, obesity, poor diet, and excessive 
smoking and drinking. A distinctive form of bounded rationally stems from neglect of the 
aggregate effect of large numbers of relatively small borrowing choices. Call this 
cumulative cost neglect.79 Addictive behavior is the most serious problem here, but 
cumulative cost neglect can be a problem even when addictions are not involved. 
When behavior is myopic, WTP will not adequately capture the welfare effects of 
choices. People may be willing to pay significant amounts for goods and for courses of 
action that do not, on balance, make their lives go better. If welfare is the goal, WTP is a 
poor guide. 
 
D. The Focusing Illusion and Immune Neglect 
 
Individual welfare is a component of many variables. If people are depressed, 
anxious, or experiencing some kind of mental illness, their subjective welfare will be low 
by definition.80 But there is a much broader problem. With respect to subjective 
happiness, individual choices may go wrong if they depend on a mistaken judgment about 
the importance of a particular choice to overall well-being. Daniel Kahneman and David 
Schkade have described the problem in a wonderful maxim: “Nothing in life matters 
                                                 
77 See Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J Legal Stud 199 (2006). 
78 See George Loewenstein and Drazen Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice, in Choices, Values, and 
Frames 592-93 (Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky eds. 2000). 
79 See Paul Slovic, Do Adolescent Smokers Know the Risks, 47 Duke LJ 1133 (1998). 
80 See Richard Layard, Happiness (2001). 
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quite as much as you think it does while you are thinking about it.”81 The general point 
here is that when focusing on a particular aspect of life, or a particular ingredient in 
welfare, people may make serious blunders.   
Consider a simple demonstration. Most people appear to believe that they would 
be happier in California.82 This belief is held by people who do and who do not live in 
California. But in fact, those who live in California are not happier than those who live 
elsewhere. Apparently they are subject to a “focusing illusion.”83 Focusing on the idea of 
California, and on California weather in particular, they believe that they would be 
happier in California even though weather is not, in fact, an important determinant of 
people’s happiness.  
Focusing illusions can be found in many domains. In particular, people neglect 
the power of psychological mechanisms that immunize them from the kinds of hedonic 
losses that they expect to face in the event that things go wrong. Consider some 
examples: 
 
1. Assistant professors greatly overstate the effect of the tenure decision on their 
subjective happiness.84 They expect that this decision will affect their happiness 
for many years, and in part for that reason, greatly want to be tenured. But after a 
few years have passed, those who are tenured show no more happiness than those 
who were denied tenure. 
2. Voters believe that the outcome of an election will greatly affect their happiness a 
month after the election is held. But in that month, losers and winners are as 
happy as they were before the election.85 
3. College students forecast that their happiness would be more affected by the 
physical features of dormitories than by the quality of social life there, but the 
                                                 
81 Kahneman and Thaler at 229. 
82 See David Schkade and Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in California Make People Happy?, 9 Psych 
Science 340 (1998). 
83 See id. 
84 Miswanting, supra note, at 186. 
85 Id. 
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opposite was true. In fact physical features had essentially no impact on their 
happiness.86 
4. People think that a year after winning the lottery, the winners are likely to be 
much happier than they were before they won the lottery. But after a year has 
passed, lottery winners are about as happy as they were before.87  
5. People expect that paraplegics will show much lower happiness levels than people 
who are able-bodied. In fact, their happiness levels are about the same.88 
6. People in the midst of a divorce believe that they will be very unhappy fifteen 
months after their divorce. In fact, their happiness levels are about the same.89  
7. Major life events, such as bereavement and marriage, are expected to have 
significant long-term consequences for subjective happiness, but the 
consequences are temporary.90 
 
There appear to be several problems here. One is that people show “immune 
neglect”; they do not see the power of their internal psychological immune system, which 
greatly diminishes the welfare effects of apparently significant changes. Another problem 
is that people demonstrate a kind of “impact bias,”91 in the form as a tendency to 
exaggerate the effect of future events on their own emotional states. People have been 
found to overestimate the welfare effects of personal insults, sports events, romantic 
breakups, electoral defeats, and much more.92 The overestimates appear to be a product 
of “duration bias,”93 understood as an exaggeration of the length of time during which 
both desirable and undesirable effects will have an emotional impact. “The conclusion 
from this body of research is that people are systematically wrong in their expectations 
about the life circumstances that will increase or decrease their happiness, which in turn 
                                                 
86 Affecting Forecasting, supra note, at 357. 
87 Kahneman and Thaler, at 230. 
88 P. Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?, 36 J Pers. and Social 
Psych. 917 (1978).  
89 Id. 
90 See Kahneman and Kruger, supra note, at 14.  
91 See Affective Forecasting, supra note, at 349. 
92 Id. at 353. 
93 Id. at 230. 
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implies that life choices that people make in their pursuit of happiness are also likely to 
be wrong.”94 
It is not yet clear how the focusing illusion and related phenomena might be 
enlisted to measure the welfare effects of various courses of action. But it is clear that 
insofar as people’s WTP is a product of such phenomena, it will lead people in directions 
that are not welfare-promoting, and that may even be harmful to their interests.  
For the legal system, there is a more concrete implication. Juries and others may 
also suffer from projection bias, and greatly exaggerate the hedonic effects of some 
losses. Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff has lost two fingers, or an arm, and the jury 
is asked to monetize the loss, including the pain and suffering associated with it. Because 
of the power of the psychological immune system, it is not implausible to think that the 
loss is short-term and very small. After a period of adjustment, those who lose two 
fingers, or even an arm, may be only trivially worse off than those who have suffered no 
such loss. Juries are unlikely to see the adaptation; in all probability, they too will suffer 
from a focusing illusion, akin to those asked whether they would be happier if they lived 
in California. It is a nice question whether in the award of damages, the legal system 
might be showing a systematic bias as a result.  
 
E. Problems, Puzzles, and Libertarian Paternalism 
 
Suppose that people’s choices often go wrong, for reasons of the sort that I have 
elaborated. It remains true that freedom of choice should be counted as both an intrinsic 
and an instrumental good. Perhaps people ought to be permitted to choose as they like, 
because it is an insult to their autonomy to deny them the right to choose, even if their 
choices do not promote their welfare. Perhaps freedom of choice should be respected 
because it is an ingredient in welfare, in the sense that people feel frustrated, and worse, 
if their choices are not honored. An understanding of failures in affective forecasting 
might not justify error-prone officials, themselves subject to similar errors, in foreclosing 
choices on welfare grounds. Indeed, public errors, in terms of affective forecasting, 
                                                 
94 Id. at 231. 
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would be far more damaging than private ones, if only because they affect so many 
people at the same time, and are less readily subject to self-correction.95 
In these circumstances, the best response to the problem sketched above might 
well be a form of “libertarian paternalism”—one that does not compromise freedom of 
choice, but that steers decisions in welfare-promoting directions.96 For libertarian 
paternalists, it is generally important to allow people to go their own way, even if social 
planners believe that their welfare is likely to be jeopardized. The planners may be 
wrong, and even if they are right, freedom of choice should ordinarily be respected. But 
libertarian paternalists also believe that default rules, information, and debiasing 
strategies97 are properly used to increase the chances that people will choose well. Such 
strategies might well be enlisted when planners have good evidence that affective 
forecasting errors are likely to occur and to produce real harm. 
A defense of libertarian paternalism is well beyond the scope of the present 
discussion.98 The major claim is theoretical rather than practical: If welfare is the goal, 
WTP will sometimes not be the means, because affective forecasting is not always 
reliable. Those who emphasize WTP, and unconstrained freedom of choice, might well 
be producing welfare losses. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In certain cases, the relationship between WTP and welfare ought to be close. 
When people will be paying all or almost all of the cost of the good that they are 
receiving, and when adequate information is available, it makes sense to use WTP. The 
analysis is more complicated when the beneficiaries are paying little or nothing for what 
they are receiving. If the beneficiaries are poor, and if those who pay are wealthy, the 
program may be welfare-promoting even if it is inefficient. We have seen that in the 
context of disability and air pollution policy, the inefficient solution might well promote 
welfare.  
                                                 
95 See Edward Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U Chi L Rev 133 (2006). 
96 See Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not An Oxymoron, 70 U Chi L 
Rev 1159 (2003). 
97 See Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, supra note. 
98 See Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: The Gentle Power of Libertarian Paternalism 
(forthcoming). 
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To be sure, the tax system is usually the best means of redistributing wealth. But 
sometimes the tax system is unavailable, and when the only options are inaction and 
inefficient regulation, the latter is sometimes best if the goal is to promote welfare. One 
implication is that it is not enough to ask for government agencies to examine whether 
the beneficiaries of regulation are poor. It is also necessary to examine the wealth or 
poverty of those who pay for regulation.  
A much more fundamental point is that people’s choices, and their WTP, may 
lead to decisions that do not promote their welfare. We have seen that increases in GDP 
do not produce increases in people’s self-reported life satisfaction—a finding that raises 
the possibility that economic growth does far less good than is customarily believed. We 
have also seen that affective forecasting is error-prone. As a result of projection bias, 
people do not see that their current emotional state can be a crude proxy for their future 
emotional state, and hence they make choices that they will later come to regret. As a 
result of unrealistic optimism, people take risks when an objective analysis of their own 
welfare suggests that they ought not to do so. As a result of myopia, people may 
decisions that produce long-term or aggregate harm. As a result of focusing illusions, 
people exaggerate the aggregate impact of specific changes on their welfare. WTP is 
often based an affective forecast, and sometimes the forecast will be badly wrong.  
Much work remains to be done to establish the appropriate response, if any, to 
these problems in terms of law and policy. At a minimum, I have suggested that there are 
serious problems with the emphasis on economic growth as the measure of social 
welfare, that an emphasis on the actual ingredients of welfare might be feasible as well as 
better, and that jury awards for hedonic damages might well be inflated. The broader 
point is that to the extent that affective forecasting errors turn out to be serious, the use of 
WTP is hard to justify from the standpoint of the very account that most plausibly 
supports it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Readers with comments should address them to: 
 
Professor Cass Sunstein 
University of Chicago Law School 
1111 East 60th Street 
Chicago, IL  60637 
 csunstei@uchicago.edu 
 32 
Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics 
(Second Series) 
 
For a listing of papers 1–200 please go to Working Papers at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html 
 
201. Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight (October 2003) 
202. David A. Weisbach, Corporate Tax Avoidance (January 2004) 
203. David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk (January 2004) 
204. Richard A. Epstein, Liberty versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright Law (April 2004) 
205. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy (January 2004) 
206. Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, A Theory of International Adjudication (February 2004) 
207. Cass R. Sunstein, Are Poor People Worth Less Than Rich People? Disaggregating the Value of Statistical 
Lives (February 2004) 
208. Richard A. Epstein, Disparities and Discrimination in Health Care Coverage; A Critique of the Institute of 
Medicine Study (March 2004) 
209. Richard A. Epstein and Bruce N. Kuhlik, Navigating the Anticommons for Pharmaceutical Patents: Steady 
the Course on Hatch-Waxman (March 2004) 
210. Richard A. Esptein, The Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules (April 2004) 
211. Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum (April 2004) 
212. Alan O. Sykes, The Persistent Puzzles of Safeguards: Lessons from the Steel Dispute (May 2004) 
213. Luis Garicano and Thomas N. Hubbard, Specialization, Firms, and Markets: The Division of Labor within 
and between Law Firms (April 2004) 
214. Luis Garicano and Thomas N. Hubbard, Hierarchies, Specialization, and the Utilization of Knowledge: 
Theory and Evidence from the Legal Services Industry (April 2004) 
215. James C. Spindler, Conflict or Credibility: Analyst Conflicts of Interest and the Market for Underwriting 
Business (July 2004) 
216. Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Public International Law (July 2004) 
217. Douglas Lichtman and Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable (July 2004) 
218. Shlomo Benartzi, Richard H. Thaler, Stephen P. Utkus, and Cass R. Sunstein, Company Stock, Market 
Rationality, and Legal Reform (July 2004) 
219. Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Deliberation, Statistical Means, and Information Markets (August 2004, 
revised October 2004) 
220.  Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions against What? The Availability Heuristic and Cross-Cultural Risk Perceptions 
(August 2004) 
221. M. Todd Henderson and James C. Spindler, Corporate Heroin: A Defense of Perks (August 2004) 
222. Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death (August 2004) 
223. Randal C. Picker, Cyber Security: Of Heterogeneity and Autarky (August 2004) 
224. Randal C. Picker, Unbundling Scope-of-Permission Goods: When Should We Invest in Reducing Entry 
Barriers? (September 2004) 
225. Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing through Law (September 2004) 
226. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of the Use of Citations in the Law (2000) 
227. Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment (October 2004) 
228. Kenneth W. Dam, Cordell Hull, the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, and the WTO (October 2004) 
229. Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation (November 2004) 
230. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy (December 2004) 
231. Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War (December 2004) 
232. Douglas Lichtman, How the Law Responds to Self-Help (December 2004) 
233. Eric A. Posner, The Decline of the International Court of Justice (December 2004) 
234. Eric A. Posner, Is the International Court of Justice Biased? (December 2004) 
235. Alan O. Sykes, Public vs. Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Of Standing and Remedy 
(February 2005) 
236. Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business Bankruptcies (March 
2005) 
237. Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law (March 2005) 
238. Randal C. Picker, Copyright and the DMCA: Market Locks and Technological Contracts (March 2005) 
239. Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of Life-Life 
Tradeoffs (March 2005) 
240. Alan O. Sykes, Trade Remedy Laws (March 2005) 
241. Randal C. Picker, Rewinding Sony: The Evolving Product, Phoning Home, and the Duty of Ongoing Design 
(March 2005) 
242. Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic (April 2005)  
243. James C. Spindler, IPO Liability and Entrepreneurial Response (May 2005) 
 33 
244. Douglas Lichtman, Substitutes for the Doctrine of Equivalents: A Response to Meurer and Nard (May 2005) 
245. Cass R. Sunstein, A New Progressivism (May 2005) 
246.  Douglas G. Baird, Property, Natural Monopoly, and the Uneasy Legacy of INS v. AP (May 2005) 
247. Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance 
(May 2005) 
248. Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War (May 2005) 
249. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero (May 2005) 
250. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities (July 2005) 
251. Joseph Bankman and David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income 
Tax (July 2005) 
252. Cass R. Sunstein and Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, and 
Intergenerational Equity (July 2005) 
253. Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing: A Consumer’s Guide (July 2005) 
254. Cass R. Sunstein, Ranking Law Schools: A Market Test? (July 2005) 
255. David A. Weisbach, Paretian Intergenerational Discounting (August 2005) 
256. Eric A. Posner, International Law: A Welfarist Approach (September 2005) 
257. Adrian Vermeule, Absolute Voting Rules (August 2005) 
258. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democratic Failure (August 2005) 
259. Douglas G. Baird and Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization 
Bargain (September 2005) 
260. Adrian Vermeule, Reparations as Rough Justice (September 2005) 
261. Arthur J. Jacobson and John P. McCormick, The Business of Business Is Democracy (September 2005) 
262. Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court Reform (October 2005) 
263. Cass R. Sunstein, The Availability Heuristic, Intuitive Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Climate Change 
(November 2005) 
264. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude (November 2005) 
265. Cass R. Sunstein, Fast, Frugal, and (Sometimes) Wrong (November 2005) 
266. Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Total Liability for Excessive Harm (November 2005) 
267. Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Breyer’s Democratic Pragmatism (November 2005) 
268. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is (November 2005, 
revised January 2006) 
269. Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares, and Jeffrey Fagan, Attention Felons: Evaluating Project Safe 
Neighborhoods in Chicago (November 2005) 
270. Lucian A. Bebchuk and Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets 
(December 2005) 
271. Kenneth W. Dam, Institutions, History, and Economics Development (January 2006, revised October 2006) 
272. Kenneth W. Dam, Land, Law and Economic Development (January 2006, revised October 2006) 
273. Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism (January 2006) 
274. Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply (January 2006) 
275. Kenneth W. Dam, China as a Test Case: Is the Rule of Law Essential for Economic Growth (January 2006, 
revised October 2006) 
276. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism (January 2006, revised August 2006) 
277. Bernard E. Harcourt, Should We Aggregate Mental Hospitalization and Prison Population Rates in Empirical 
Research on the Relationship between Incarceration and Crime, Unemployment, Poverty, and Other Social 
Indicators?  On the Continuity of Spatial Exclusion and Confinement in Twentieth Century United States 
(January 2006) 
278. Elizabeth Garrett and Adrian Vermeule, Transparency in the Budget Process (January 2006) 
279. Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, An Economic Analysis of State and Individual Responsibility under 
International Law (February 2006) 
280. Kenneth W. Dam, Equity Markets, The Corporation and Economic Development (February 2006, revised 
October 2006) 
281. Kenneth W. Dam, Credit Markets, Creditors’ Rights and Economic Development (February 2006) 
282. Douglas G. Lichtman, Defusing DRM (February 2006) 
283. Jeff Leslie and Cass R. Sunstein, Animal Rights without Controversy (March 2006) 
284. Adrian Vermeule, The Delegation Lottery (March 2006) 
285. Shahar J. Dilbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protecting “Irrational Beliefs” (March 
2006) 
286. Adrian Vermeule, Self-Defeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency Powers (March 2006) 
287. Kenneth W. Dam, The Judiciary and Economic Development (March 2006, revised October 2006) 
288. Bernard E. Harcourt: Muslim Profiles Post 9/11: Is Racial Profiling an Effective Counterterrorist Measure 
and Does It Violate the Right to Be Free from Discrimination? (March 2006) 
289. Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias (April 2006) 
 34 
290. Lior J. Strahilevitz, “How’s My Driving?” for Everyone (and Everything?) (April 2006) 
291. Randal C. Picker, Mistrust-Based Digital Rights Management (April 2006) 
292. Douglas Lichtman, Patent Holdouts and the Standard-Setting Process (May 2006) 
293. Jacob E. Gersen and Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule (June 2006)  
294. Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?  An Empirical Investigation of 
Chevron (June 2006) 
295. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change (June 2006) 
296. Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation (June 2006) 
297. David A. Weisbach, Implementing Income and Consumption Taxes: An Essay in Honor of David Bradford 
(June 2006) 
298. David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, and Reid Hastie, What Happened on Deliberation Day? (June 2006) 
299. David A. Weisbach, Tax Expenditures, Principle Agent Problems, and Redundancy (June 2006) 
300. Adam B. Cox, The Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights (July 2006) 
301. Adam B. Cox, Designing Redistricting Institutions (July 2006) 
302. Cass R. Sunstein, Montreal vs. Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols (August 2006) 
303. Kenneth W. Dam, Legal Institutions, Legal Origins, and Governance (August 2006) 
304. Anup Malani and Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities (September 2006) 
305. Douglas Lichtman, Irreparable Benefits (September 2006) 
306. M. Todd Henderson, Payiing CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation when Agency Costs Are Low 
(September 2006) 
307. Michael Abramowicz and M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate Governance (September 
2006) 
308. Randal C. Picker, Who Should Regulate Entry into IPTV and Municipal Wireless? (September 2006) 
309. Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive (September 2006) 
310. David Gilo and Ariel Porat, The Unconventional Uses of Transaction Costs (October 2006) 
311. Randal C. Picker, Review of Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution (October 2006) 
312. Dennis W. Carlton and Randal C. Picker, Antitrust and Regulation (October 2006) 
313. Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Liability Externalities and Mandatory Choices: Should Doctors Pay Less? 
(November 2006) 
314. Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law (November 2006) 
315. Lior J. Strahilevitz, Wealth without Markets? (November 2006) 
316. Ariel Porat, Offsetting Risks (November 2006) 
317. Bernard E. Harcourt and Jens Ludwig, Reefer Madness: Broken Windows Policing and Misdemeanor 
Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 1989–2000 (December 2006) 
318. Bernard E. Harcourt, Embracing Chance: Post-Modern Meditations on Punishment (December 2006) 
319. Cass R. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism (December 2006) 
320. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Presidential Pardons and Commutations 
(January 2007) 
321. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberating Groups versus Prediction Markets (or Hayek’s Challenge to Habermas) 
(January 2007) 
322. Cass R. Sunstein, Completely Theorized Agreements in Constitutional Law (January 2007) 
323. Albert H. Choi and Eric A. Posner, A Critique of the Odious Debt Doctrine (January 2007) 
324. Wayne Hsiung and Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Animals (January 2007) 
325. Cass. R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis without Analyzing Costs or Benefits: Reasonable Accommodation, 
Balancing and Stigmatic Harms (January 2007) 
326. Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness to Pay versus Welfare (January 2007) 
327. David A. Weisbach, The Irreducible Complexity of Firm-Level Income Taxes: Theory and Doctrine in the 
Corporate Tax (January 2007) 
 
